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Abstract:  
The article investigates how welfare chauvinism differs across various social benefits and services. The 
case is Danes’ attitudes towards granting social rights to Eastern European workers. For some 
programs a clear majority favours giving social rights immediately on arrival, e.g. rights to health care, 
whereas permanent exclusion is favoured for other programs, e.g. child allowances given to children in 
country of origin. These findings support the thesis of program-specific welfare chauvinism and point 
to a political space for pragmatic adjustments of current EU rules. The article also finds similarity 
across programs. The Danish welfare chauvinist attitudes are in general fuelled by lack of shared 
identity with migrants and sociotropic concerns about the economic burden of migration. The article 
finds little evidence of narrow self-interest effects; with a notable exception of disability pensioners 
having stronger welfare chauvinist attitudes than other groups.   
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Introduction 
Welfare chauvinism is often believed to be the new winning formula for new-right-wing parties in 
Europe. The formula was pioneered in Denmark, where political entrepreneurs in 1995 broke with the 
former populist anti-tax party, Fremskridtspartiet, and created a new anti-migration, anti-EU and pro-
welfare party called Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s party). According to Schumacher & 
Kersbergen (2014) “welfare chauvinism was pioneered by the Danish People’s Party (DF) and this 
party’s electoral success and influence on government policy has motivated diffusion of welfare 
chauvinism to the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) and to a lesser extent to the Sweden Democrats 
(SD),The Finns (PS) and the French National Front (FN)”. Working on party manifesto data, Eger & 
Valdez (2014) show how this “welfare for our kind” has become a pivotal element among the new-
right-parties in Europe. The rise of welfare chauvinism could set Europe on a different path than the 
US. In the US context playing the race-card typically lowered overall support progressive policies 
(Alesina et al., 1999; e.g. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; e.g. Quadagno, 1994). In the European context 
with a popular welfare state is already in place (in contrast to the US case) and with multiparty party 
system making it possible to combine anti-migrant-, anti-EU- and pro-welfare-attitudes (in contrast to 
the two party system of the US) ethnic diversity is more likely to lead to welfare chauvinism. The new-
right parties have successfully exploited these European opportunity structures and are likely to 
continue down this path.  There are a number of examples of national legislation, which limits the 
social rights of migrants while maintaining rights for natives (see details for Danish case below). 
National parliaments are free to do so in the case of non-EU-migrants, while the EU-treaties (and there 
interpretation by the EU court) do protect some of the rights of EU-migrants. The latter has made the 
new right-wing parties able to fuse their EU-skepticism and their anti-immigration position, which has 
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become a serious challenge for the free movement of labour within EU; in the UK-case it even came to 
jeopardize the whole EU-membership.   
 The aim of the article is to describe to what extent the welfare chauvinism that underpins voting 
for new-right-wing parties is uniformly applied to all kinds of benefits and services. This question has 
not been studied before, primarily due to data limitations. It is, however, of crucial importance for real 
world policy making. If a majority rejects giving any social right to migrants, it will be close to 
impossible to prevent large differences in living conditions and to uphold free movement of workers 
within Europe. If it is only a specific kind of entitlements that fuel welfare chauvinism, one can 
imagine a number of efficient smaller adjustments, e.g. following the lines of the EU-offer to UK (19
th
 
of February) prior to membership referendum 23
th
 of June 2016. In the theoretical discussion, the 
article distinguishes between attitudes based on self-interest rationales, solidarity rationales (recipient 
focused) and sociotropic rationales (state focused). In all three frameworks one can both make the case 
for one-dimensionality and multi-dimensionality in public attitudes towards migrants’ entitlement to 
social rights.  
 
Theory  
Most previous studies have treated welfare chauvinism as something that is applied uniformly across 
various social benefits and services. This both holds true for the previous empirical studies (Gerhards 
and Lengfeld, 2013; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 
2012; Van der Waal et al., 2010; Van Der Waal et al., 2013) as well as for most of the previous 
theoretical debate (Johnston et al., 2010; Kymlicka and Banting, 2006; e.g. Miller, 1993). One could 
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label it “general welfare chauvinism”. The political rhetoric of the new-right parties is also geared to 
pose the question about welfare entitlements of migrants in this one-dimensional way. However, there 
are good theoretical reasons to believe that the public attitudes towards migrants’ welfare entitlements 
could be rather multidimensional. One could label it “program-specific welfare chauvinism”.  The 
study of attitudes towards social entitlements of migrants is placed at a cross-road between the many 
studies of attitudes to migration/migrants and the many studies of attitudes to welfare 
schemes/redistribution. Thus, both strands of literature can be used to theorize whether the welfare 
chauvinist public attitudes are applied broadly across all kinds of benefits and services or vary across 
programs. The most coherent way to theoretically combine the two strands of literature is to look at 
how the traditions imagine the rationales behind the public attitudes.    
 
General versus program specific welfare-chauvinism in a self-interest perspective 
Reluctance to grant migrants social rights could be rooted in self-interest; following a long tradition 
both in studies of general attitudes to migration and general attitudes to welfare schemes. The main 
argument is that welfare chauvinist attitudes derive from competition (imagined or real) for resources 
(jobs, benefits, and services) between natives and migrants. In this setup welfare chauvinist attitudes 
are believed to be strongest among those who stand to lose the most if migrants are granted social 
rights. This is often operationalized as the lower strata of society; those in precarious jobs, unskilled 
workers or those living on welfare benefits. These groups are believed to face the strongest competition 
from migrants on the labor market (that could be attracted by generous rights) and those with strongest 
self-interest in not sharing limited resources (in the case migrants fall short of work). This could lead 
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lower strata of society to a uniform across-program rejection of granting social right to migrants, which 
is often what is theorized in previous studies (a pionering article in this field was Scheve and Slaughter, 
2001). In contrast, the upper strata are believed to have less to lose as face less competition on the labor 
market and are less dependent on welfare benefits and more to win by having cheap labor in the 
country.  
   One could, however, also imagine a more sophisticated calculation of self-interest. One of the 
standard arguments is that recipients of given benefits and services would be especially reluctant to 
include migrants in “their” scheme (e.g. Hedegaard and Larsen, 2014), which have not be studied in 
relation to welfare chauvinism. Other effects could also be imagined. On the one hand, granting social 
rights to migrants could increase immigration (or at least be imagined to do so), which would increase 
the competition lower strata face at the labour market. However, on the other hand, granting social 
rights to migrants is also a shield against low-wage competition because decent levels of services and 
benefits install a fairly high reservation wage (especially so in the Danish case). Unemployment 
benefits and social assistance would be the two schemes that provide the best shields for low-wage 
competition through reservation wage effects. Thus, from a self-interest perspective one should expect 
lower strata to at least be ambivalent about access to these two classic schemes. The self-interest of 
upper strata is neither straightforward as benefits and services often have an element of tax financing 
(especially in the Danish case). From a self-interest perspective upper strata might be better off by not 
granting benefits and services (as it lowers tax burden, or at least the imagined tax burden) and secures 
cheap labor (as it keeps low reservation wages). This could make the upper strata especially reluctant to 
grant unemployment benefits and social assistance to migrants as they (can be imagined to) attract the 
unproductive workers and hinder the low-wage service production typically consumed by the upper 
strata.  
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General versus program specific welfare-chauvinism in a recipient focused solidarity perspective 
The second main explanation for welfare chauvinism has been the lack of shared identity with 
migrants. The basic argument for an across-program rejection of the rights of migrants is that support 
for social policies is rooted in a feeling of mutual shared identity among the members of a given nation 
(e.g. Miller, 1993). This is an understandable argument as the nation state formed the boundaries of the 
democracy, the political mobilization and the class compromises that fostered the modern welfare state. 
It is easy to imagine that citizens form a hardline between those outside and inside the boundaries of 
the nation state. In a simple sense everyone are welfare chauvinists; no one seems to imagine that e.g. 
the Danish people’s pension should be paid to a Malaysian woman who has never been in Denmark. 
Thus, migrants constitute a grey zone between those who are included and excluded from the nation. A 
previous study found that immigrants are seen as the least deserving, in comparison with other 
(imagined) national groups (e.g. van Oorschot, 2006). In this framework, variations in welfare 
chauvinism could reflect fundamental attitudes about what it takes to become part of the nation. The 
distinction between ethnic and civic nation perceptions has been prominent (Janmaat, 2006; e.g. Kohn, 
1944) and previous research has often assumed those with ethnic nation perceptions to be uniformly 
against any kind of inclusion of migrants.  
 If welfare chauvinism is rooted in lack of solidarity with recipients, one could, however, also 
expect some cross-program variation. One of the standard arguments has been that the public make 
moral judgments about whether the target groups of the different schemes deserve to be help or not. 
One of the important criteria (besides shared identity)- is whether the members of target group of a 
given scheme are seen as been in control or out of control of their situation (Larsen, 2006; Petersen, 
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2009; Van Oorschot, 2005). Sickness and old-age is typically seen as something uncontrollable, which 
foster public support, while unemployment is typically seen as something more controllable, which 
erode public support (though it depends a little on the unemployment level and the structure of the 
labor market). Another common argument is that the programmatic structures of the various schemes 
shape the deservingness judgments. The standard argument is that more universal schemes, covering 
larger groups of citizens, generate public support due to the target group consisting of “normal people”, 
whereas as more residual schemes, covering only the weakest citizens, erode public support due to the 
target group consisting of “the deviant” (Larsen, 2006; Larsen and Dejgaard, 2013; Rothstein, 1998). 
How the insurance design influence in feeling of solidarity/shared identity with recipients of these 
benefits and services is less theorized and studied. In previous studies these arguments have been used 
to explain the relative low level of welfare chauvinism found in the Nordic countries, at least when 
measured by a single item (Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Van Der Waal et al., 2013). Following this logic 
of the “image of the target group”, one often expects most hostility towards granting access to target 
benefits.  
 
General versus program specific welfare-chauvinism in a soiotropic perspective 
To these two main explanations one could add a third explanation, which I will label sociotropic 
reasoning. The argument is that welfare chauvinism could (also) be rooted in concerns about the 
function of overall society. Within election research voting rooted in the overall (perceived) need of the 
national economy over one’s own pocket book is labelled sociotropic voting (e.g. Kinder and Kiewiet, 
1981). This perspective is also found in studies of general attitudes to migration (see Hainmueller and 
Hopkins, 2014 for an excellent metastudy) but can also be found within the welfare state literature. In 
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the latter tradition, welfare schemes are seen as functional arrangements that take care of the risks that 
need to be covered, as another insurance company, and the tasks that need to be done, as another 
service provider (e.g. Barr, 2001). Thus, welfare chauvinism might not (only) be rooted in calculation 
of self-interest or absence of (recipient focused) solidarity feelings but could also be rooted in 
perceptions about migration being dysfunctional for the welfare state. In such a framework, the 
(perceived) costs and benefits for overall society of granting social rights to migrants is likely to hold a 
prominent place. An overall negative assessment of the societal impact of migration on the welfare 
state could lead to an overall across program rejection of granting social rights to migrants. The other 
way around, seeing migrants as contributing to the survival of the welfare state would lead to less 
general welfare chauvinism. Hjorth (2015) e.g. shows that Swedes are more reluctant to give to 
Bulgarians (often imagined as those with low human capital) than to Dutch (often imagined as those 
with high human capital). 
 If welfare chauvinism is rooted in sociotropic concerns, one could, however, also imagine 
cross-program variations. Granting access to some schemes could be seen as more functional and less 
dysfunctional than granting access to other schemes. One of the standards arguments in the literature 
has been that universal organized programs are (or at least perceived to be)  more functional and less 
dysfunctional due to low levels of bureaucracy, low risk of welfare fraud and moderate influence on 
work incentives (in contrast to targeted schemes). This would again make an argument for less 
reluctance to give access to universal schemes. It has, however, also been argued that universal 
schemes could increase welfare chauvinism. The problem is that immigrants have direct access to these 
benefits and services; in contrast to means-tested benefits and services only giving to migrants in need 
and insurance based benefits and services only giving to migrants that have paid the insurance. This 
kind of easy access could function as magnet for migrants with low human capital (e.g. the Bulgarians 
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in Hjort’s study). Following this argument Bay and Pedersen show that (imagined) inclusion of 
migrants leads to much lower levels of support when Norwegians in survey experiments are asked 
about a basic income scheme, the ultimate universal scheme (2006). This could make the public less 
inclined to grant access to universal schemes. The article will nuance this classic debate about 
universalism by distinguishing between benefits and services. The logic is that in contrast to benefits, 
services cannot through remittances be channeled to the country of origin; as in the sensitive case of 
child-allowances paid to children living in the country of origin (see below). Services are consumed in 
the host country and can easily been seen as functional ways to make society work.  
 
The difficult distinctions  
Empirically it is difficult to keep the three theoretical frameworks apart. The strong link between socio-
economic position and welfare chauvinism found in previous studies (e.g. Mewes and Mau, 2012; 
Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007) could both be a matter of self-
interest, ethnic nation perceptions or sociotropic concerns. One could even argue that what 
characterizes a winning political formula is exactly the ability to speak to self-interest, feelings of 
solidarity and rational thinking about what is functional for the overall society at the same time.  
Therefore the first thesis (H1) is simply that public attitudes towards granting migrant social rights are 
fairly uniform across programs. As for the prediction of multi-dimensionality in public attitudes, it is 
also difficult empirically to distinguish between the potential causes of cross-program variations. It is a 
classic problem that it is difficult to distinguish the effects connected to the risks that a given program 
covers (e.g. sickness versus unemployment), the effects connect to institutional structure of a given 
program (universal schemes versus targeted schemes) and the self-interest (especially if measured as 
potential insurance e.g. against sickness and old-age). Therefore the second thesis is simply thesis that 
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public attitudes towards granting social rights to migrants vary significantly across programs (H2).  It is 
a task for future research to disentangle the details of the causes of program-specific welfare 
chauvinism.  
 
The Danish case 
In terms of politics and public policies, Denmark is often used as a clear-cut example of general 
welfare chauvinism. The Danish new right wing party, Dansk Folkeparti, has grown from an electoral 
basic of 7.4 percent in the 1998-election to 21.1 percent in the 2015-election; making it the largest 
Danish right-wing party. The Danish People Party even obtained 27 percent of the votes for the EU 
parliament election in 2014. The party has never been in office but has functioned as the parliamentary 
basis of the right-wing government in office from 2001 to 2011 and again from 2015 and onwards. This 
coalition has especially changed the social assistance scheme. The changes were presented as having 
the double purpose of creating better economic job-incentives for non-Western migrants and limiting 
the inflow of migrants from non-Western countries. The most dramatic change, firstly, was the 
establishment of a new social scheme for migrants (2002), who within the last 8 years have not been 
seven year in the country (carrying the strange name “Start help”). The benefit was 35 to 50 percent 
lower than ordinary social assistance, depending on household composition (the largest reductions were 
for people with children). Secondly, the government introduced cuts in the ordinary social assistance 
scheme for families where both partners were on social assistance (2002). The majority of these 
families had a non-Western background. The 2002-reform reduced the normal social assistance for this 
group by some 1000 DKK per month (135 €) after six months. The government also introduced a 
ceiling (in order to reduce the use of additional support), which for some families meant a reduction of 
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up to 2580 DKK (about 350 €) per month. Furthermore if a wife was considered to be a housewife 
unavailable for the labour market (typically imagined as a migrant), social assistance was withdrawn 
and replaced by a housewife supplement. Finally, these measures were in 2005 supplemented with a 
300-hours-rule that demanded 300 hours of ordinary work (within the last two years) if two spouses 
(with work ability) were to receive social assistance. These measures were in place until 2011 when a 
Social Democratic government came into office and abolished these rules, which it in the electoral 
campaign successfully labelled “poverty benefits”. Once back in office in 2015, the right-wing 
government re-introduced the lower levels for newly arrived migrants (2015), the ceiling for spouses 
on ordinary social assistance (2016) and a modified version of the 300-hours-rule (2016).  
In principle the EU-treaties guarantee the free movement of EU-workers and their access to 
benefits and services. In practice, however, the social rights of EU-citizens are established in a complex 
interaction between the EU-court, the EU commission and the member states. In the Danish case, a few 
rules were changes when the country entered EU in 1972; most importantly a demand of 40 years of 
residence (or employment) in Denmark for obtaining the full universal people pension. Besides these 
first adjustments EU migrants’ access to benefits and services was rarely on the political agenda. This 
changed with the EU east-enlargements. The Danish government commissioned a report, “Danske 
sociale ydelser i lyset af udvidelsen med EU” (Danish social benefits in the light of the EU 
enlargement, published in April 2003), which made an overview of all the potential rights Eastern 
European worker could obtain in Denmark. As most of the other EU-members, Denmark used the 
possibility to apply a five year transition rule. For the ten new EU-members, workers could only enter 
Denmark if they had a signed contract for full-time work on Danish labour market conditions 
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(established in the collective agreement between employers and unions). In the case, they lost the 
contracted job they were not allowed to stay in Denmark.  
These transition rules were slowly phased out and by 2009 Eastern-EU citizens got the same 
rights as other EU-citizens to work in Denmark. This started a new heated debated (autumn 2010), w 
hich made the government commission yet another report, “Rapport om optjeningsprincipper i forhold 
til danske velfærdsydelser” (Report about entitlement principles in relation to Danish welfare benefits, 
published in March 2011). It vigorously describes EU-migrants access to social benefits and services 
and possibilities to restrict them within the boundaries of the EU-treaties. As in the UK, the most 
heated issue was about child allowances given to children of temporary Eastern European workers 
living in the country of origin. The respond of the government was to introduce a rule (2010) that 
required two years of residence (or employment) in Denmark (within the last ten years) before full 
child-allowances was granted to these children. The government also reduced child-allowances of 
parents with more than two children (based on the miscalculation that migrants have larger families). In 
April 2013, the EU-commission stated that the Danish two-year-rule was illegal. Therefore the rule was 
abolished in June 2013, which started yet another political debate on the issue; the right-wing parties, 
now in opposition, demanding that the Social-democratic led government should test the position of the 
EU-commission in the EU-court. The Social democrats also abolished the third-child-rule but replaced 
ceiling to exclude high-income earners. Eastern European workers’ easier access to unemployment 
benefits became another political issue. Danish workers are, besides insurance payment, required 52 
weeks of work within the last three years before unemployment benefits can be obtained. According to 
the EU-commission, EU-workers entitled to unemployment benefits in the country of origin (regardless 
of softer entitlement criteria) should be granted full unemployment benefits in Denmark (under the 
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condition of insurance payment in Denmark). In order to reduce such “problems” Denmark installed a 
practice that demanded three months of work and insurance payment in Denmark before 
unemployment benefits could be obtained. The EU-commission has also deemed this rule illegal but it 
has not yet been changed.  
Judged by these policy changes the Danish case, and the public attitudes that underpin it, could 
seem like a best case for general welfare chauvinism. Especially so, as national economic studies 
clearly indicate that Denmark gain economically from EU-migration (e.g. Hansen et al., 2015). In the 
2015 election campaign the winning right-wing government committed itself to take a tougher stand 
towards the EU-commission and work for changes in the EU-legislation. Therefore the EU-offer to UK 
about in-work benefits was celebrated as a political success that potentially could solve a number of 
sensitive Danish issue. Denmark had declared that it will use the new possibility to index child-
allowances (to living cost in the country of origin) and elements in the EU-offer to the UK.  
 
Data and method  
The study of welfare chauvinism is in its early stages and has so far relied on a few general survey 
items. Most studies have used the one item available in the European Social Survey (ESS), “Thinking 
of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the 
same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?” (Mewes and Mau, 2012; 
Mewes and Mau, 2013; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012; Van Der Waal et al., 2013), which implicit 
carries the assumption that the welfare chauvinism cut across all types of migrants and across all types 
of benefits and services. Measured by this ESS-item Danes do not stand out as particular chauvinistic. 
 14 
 
As in other European countries, the most common answer is that migrants should obtain the same right 
“once they have become citizens” (36 percent) or “after worked and paid taxes at least a year” (32 
percent). But there is also a fairly large share that answers that rights should be granted “immediately 
on arrival” (14 percent) or “after a year, whether or not have worked” (16 percent). The size of these 
latter two non-chauvinist positions is only surpassed by Sweden and Israel (among the 29 countries in 
the ESS data). This could reflect a broad public opposition within Denmark to the policies implemented 
by the right-wing governments in office but it could also reflect large cross-program variations that 
cannot be studied by means of the ESS-item. Therefore national data was collected, which enabled us 
to break chauvinist attitudes down by programs. We asked about the social rights of workers coming 
from Eastern Europe in order to link to the questions in the contemporary national debate;  in contrast 
to the ESS question about “people from other countries”. The following introduction text was used “In 
relation to migration of East European workforce it has been discussed, when and to what extent they 
should have the same rights as Danish citizens. When do you think workers from Eastern Europe 
should have the same rights as citizens that already live here?”. We used the same response categories 
as in the ESS; i.e. 1) immediately on arrival, 2) after living in  Denmark for a year, whether or not they 
have worked, 3) only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year, 4) once they have 
become a Danish citizen and 5) they should never get the same rights.  
Four service schemes where included in the data; 1) right to treatment at hospitals, 2) right to 
child-care institutions, 3) right to primary and secondary schooling for children living in the country 
and 4) right to university schooling for children living in the country. All of the four services are 
organized along universal principles, i.e. rights are giving to all with residence (independent on 
economic income), the services are paid by general taxes (except an additional user fee in child-care 
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facilities) and the services are fairly uniform and adequate throughout the country. In terms of social 
expenditures these four programs constitute a large part of the Danish welfare state (elderly care 
facilities are not included as most Eastern European workers come in working age). Four benefits 
scheme were also included; 1) right to child-allowance to children living in Denmark, 2) right to child-
allowances to children living in the country of origin, 3) right to unemployment benefits and 4) right to 
social assistance. The child-allowance is a universal benefit (though a ceiling was implemented in 
2012), unemployment benefits is an insurance benefits (voluntary insurance, though tax subsidized) 
and social assistance is a classic means-tested benefit.  
The survey data was collected among 18-74 years old in the period from 28
th
 of November 
2014 to 2
nd
 of January 2015. We used YOUGOV standing representation web panel with a total of 
2287 interviews. Judged by socio-economic composition the sample is close to representative but in the 
analysis to come the data is weighted by sex, age (four groups), geography (five regions) and education 
(eight groups); primarily it corrects for too few without any education (above primary and secondary 
level) in the sample. If H1 (general welfare chauvinism) is right, one should expect little variation 
across programs, if H2 (program-specific welfare chauvinism) is right, large variation across programs 
should be found. This preposition is tested by means of simple descriptive analyses in the next section.  
If H1 is right one should also expect similar correlations with explanatory variables across 
programs. If H2 is right, one could expect the opposite. As explanatory variables were used: 1) socio-
economic position measured by type of occupation and type of received benefit (in order to capture 
self-interest effects); 2) agreement or disagreement with a statement about migration being a threat to 
Danish culture (in order to capture ethnic nationhood perceptions, wording “Migration pose a serious 
threat to our national culture/identity”; five point likert scale); 3) perception of migrants being net-
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winners or net-losers on the Danish welfare state (in order to capture a sociotropic concern; wording 
“Migration and refugees have come to Denmark for many various reasons. Some work and pay taxes 
but at the same time they also use healthcare and welfare benefits/services. Do you think migrations 
and refugees in general receive more than they contribute with”; 0 – 10 point scale) and 4) agreement 
or disagreement in the statement that EU citizens’ right to receive Danish welfare benefits and services 
is a serious threat to the Danish welfare state (in order to capture another sociotropic concern; wording 
“The rights of EU-citizens to receive Danish welfare benefits/services pose a serious threat to the 
Danish welfare state”; five point likert scale). In order to ease interpretation of estimates and 
comparison across models simple OLS-regression is applied. The dependent variable is welfare 
chauvinism measured on a scale from 1 (“access immediately on arrival”) to 5 (“never”); i.e. higher 
values indicates higher welfare chauvinism, see Table 1. Ordinal logistic models give very similar 
results (see Table A2 in online appendix); the few differences that were found between the OLS- and 
the Ordinal-logistic-models are stated in the text. 
 
Welfare chauvinism across benefits and services  
The distributions on the dependent variables are shown in Table 1 (schemes are ranged after degree of 
welfare chauvinism measured by mean). The simple bivariate results indicate a large variation across 
schemes. There is a majority, 56 percent, which is willing to give Eastern European workers access to 
treatments at hospitals immediately on arrival. There is also a majority, 53 percent, which is willing to 
give immediate access to primary and secondary schooling for the children of EasternEuropean 
workers. If one adds the share answering “after living in Denmark for a year, whether or not they have 
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worked” there is also a majority (42 percent plus 9 percent) in favour of given access to the child-care 
institutions.  Thus, there seem to be widespread support for giving access to the Nordic universal 
service schemes; a much larger support than what could be inferred from the Danish answers to the 
general ESS-item. In terms of services, the exception is access to university education. Here the public 
is somewhat divided and more in line with the ESS-data; 30 percent answer immediately on arrival, 
nine percent answer after a year,  30 percent answer only after worked and paid taxes a year, 27 percent 
answer once they have become Danish citizens and  finally five percent answer never.  
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Table 1: Public attitudes to when workers from East Europe should have the same rights to various 
welfare schemes as Danish citizens (n=2287). 
 Immedia-
tely on 
arrival 
After 
living in  
Denmark 
for a year, 
whether or 
not they 
have 
worked 
Only after 
they have 
worked 
and paid 
taxes for 
at least a 
year 
Once they 
have 
become a 
Danish 
citizen 
They 
should 
never get 
the same 
rights 
Total Mean 
(1-5) 
Treatment at 
hospitals  
56 7 22 12 3 100 2.0 
Primary and 
secondary schooling 
for children living in 
the country 
53 7 20 16 4 100 2.1 
Child-care 
institutions 
42 9 29 17 4 100 2.3 
University schooling 
for children living in 
the country 
30 9 30 27 5 100 2.7 
        
Child-allowance to 
children living in the 
country: 
15 9 38 31 7 100 3.1 
Social assistance: 9 9 43 30 8 100 3.2 
Unemployment 
benefits 
14 8 51 22 5 100 3.9 
Child-allowances to 
children living in the 
country of origin 
3 3 17 23 53 100 4.2 
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The Danes are more reluctant to give access to the four different kinds of benefits, which also have 
been the subject to intense national policy debates. Only 15 percent think that Eastern European 
workers’ children living in Denmark immediately should be given the same rights to child-allowance as 
Danish citizens. The public is also reluctant to give immediate access to social assistance and 
unemployment benefits; only nine and 14 percent support access immediately on arrival. The most 
common answer for child allowances (to children living in Denmark), social assistance and 
unemployment benefits is that the same right should only be given after Eastern European workers 
have worked and paid taxes for at least a year or once they have become Danish citizens, i.e. clearly a 
conditional access, which is also the typical response in the ESS. Finally, there is clear evidence that 
giving child-allowances to children living in the country of origin is highly contested; a majority, 53 
percent, indicates that Eastern European workers should never be given such rights. Thus, on this issue 
the public holds much stronger welfare chauvinist attitudes than what was found in the ESS-data.  
  The 491 respondents who would vote for Danish people’s party (if there was a general election 
tomorrow) are less inclined to give migrants access to all eights welfare rights (see online appendix 
Table A1). However, even within this mobilized group there is cross-program variation. 38 percent and 
35 percent of the DF-voters would grant Eastern European workers immediate access to treatment at 
hospitals and access to primary and secondary schooling.  These DF-voters are also clearly against 
sending child-allowances to children living in country of origin. However, on the other seven items 
only small minorities of DF-voters indicated that access should never be granted (range from seven to 
16 percent). Thus, it is not a matter of never granting EU-migrants social rights. Even for this 
mobilized group it is a matter of under what conditions social rights should be granted. 
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 These bivariate distributions support the argument that welfare chauvinism varies across 
programs. However, this does not mean that being welfare chauvinist in one area is unrelated to being 
welfare chauvinist in another; it could be (large) variations across a more general attitude. 
Unsurprisingly, this is what standard factor analyses suggest. Factor analyses (principal component, 
rotated) indicate a strong first dimension (eigenvalue 4.72) and a weaker second dimension (eigenvalue 
1.09). The second dimension contains attitude to the question about child-allowances to children living 
in country of origin, which is special sensitive issue. Thus, based on factor analyses one could conclude 
that the Danish attitude structure is one- or two-dimensional. A more interesting question, however, is 
whether correlations with explanatory variables are the same across programs as it might help explain 
some of the large across program variation.  
 
Variations in correlations with explanatory variables 
Two consistent across-program correlations are found in the models. The first is a strong and 
significant correlation between perceiving migration as a threat to Danish culture and welfare 
chauvinism; for all eight items positive correlation is found (ranking from 0.097 to 0.23; see Table 2). 
In the case of access to hospital treatment it is e.g. estimated that a person who “strongly agree” (5) in 
migration being a threat to Danish culture score 0.76 point higher (4 times 0.19) than a person who 
“strongly disagree” (1) in the statement. This supports the preposition that absence of shared identity 
establishes welfare chauvinism across programs. The other consistent across program finding is a 
strong and significant correlation between judgments of migrants’ contribution to the Danish welfare 
state and welfare chauvinism; on all eight items those thinking migrants put more in than they take out 
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hold less welfare chauvinist attitudes. It is e.g. estimated that a person who indicates that migrants put 
much more in than they take out (answering 10 on the scale) scores 0.64 lower on the scale for access 
to hospitals than does a person who indicates that migrants take much more out than they put in 
(answering 0 on the scale); 10 times -0.064. This supports the preposition that sociotropic concerns 
about the economic burden of migration can establish welfare chauvinism across programs. The other 
measure of sociotropic concern, the perception of EU-laws being a threat to the Danish welfare state, is 
less uniformly correlated with welfare chauvinism. The link between EU-threat and welfare 
chauvinism is strongest for attitudes to child allowances given to children in the country of origin 
(0.22) as one would expect from the controversy between the Danish governments and the EU-
commission. There is a weaker, but still significant, correlation between this concern and reluctance to 
give access to social assistance (0.16), child-allowances in host-country (0.15), unemployment benefit 
(0.12) and universities (0.13). The concern of EU-laws being a threat to the Danish welfare states is 
weaker correlated with attitudes to given access to hospitals, child-care and schools; though still 
significant in OLS-regression for child-care and for all three areas in ordinal logistic models (see online 
appendix Table A2).  
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Table 2: OLS-regression. Beta-coefficients (bold significant at minimum 0.05-level; n=2287)  
 Hospitals Child-
care 
Schools Univer-
sity 
Unemplo
yment 
benefits: 
Child-
allowan-
ce (host) 
Social 
assistan-
ce: 
Child-
allowan-
ce 
(origin) 
Constant 1.784 1.414 1.754 1.444 2.232 2.185 2.597 3.171 
Gender .147 .235 0.204 .178 .038 0.03 0.002 -.115 
Age 
 
-.015 -.007 -0.014 -.004 -.002 -0.005 -0.007 .006 
Blue collar 
unskilled  
.199 .166 0.197 .035 .183 0.109 0.02 -.014 
Blue collar 
skilled  
.125 .096 0.103 .047 .071 0.112 -0.049 -.007 
White-collar 
low 
.188 .088 0.064 .154 .060 0.055 0.067 .055 
Whiter-collar 
high 
Ref. Ref. Ref Ref. Ref Ref. Ref. Ref. 
self employed .054 .072 -0.005 .041 -.047 -0.052 0.069 -.180 
Unemployed 
(insured) 
.016 -.012 -0.005 .084 -.050 -0.233 -0.154 -.081 
Unemployed 
(social 
assistance) 
-.041 .282 0.112 .020 .174 0.036 -0.21 .241 
Disability 
benefits 
.020 .282 0.276 .265 .180 0.281 0.053 -.086 
Pensioner (and 
early retired) 
.075 .170 0.162 -.005 -.035 -0.009 0.026 -.161 
Students -.072 .064 -0.126 -.088 .057 0.015 0.022 .020 
Others 
 
.075 .088 0.132 .272 .157 0.159 0.119 -.018 
Cultural threat 
(1-5) 
.190 .229 0.191 .232 .139 0.208 0.155 .097 
Contribution 
(0-10) 
-.064 -.074 -0.063 -.070 -.069 -0.091 -0.075 -.062 
EU-welfare 
threat (1-5) 
.034 .059 0.04 .133 .119 0.151 0.16 .224 
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 The correlations with socio-economic positions are scattered. Taken perception of cultural 
threat and sociotropic concerns into account, there are few independent effects from socio-economic 
position on welfare chauvinism. The unskilled and skilled blue-collar workers do seem to hold more 
welfare chauvinist attitudes than do the well-educated high white collar workers (in general the group 
with the least welfare chauvinist attitudes, therefore used as reference group). However, the difference 
only turns significant in the case of access to unemployment benefits. Thus, the argument that blue-
collar workers from a self-interest perspective could perceive unemployment benefits as a shield 
against wage competition, which could lower welfare chauvinism, received not support. In fact this was 
the only benefit where blue-collar workers were significant more welfare chauvinist than were higher 
white collar workers. 
Those living on public benefits are neither much more welfare chauvinist than are high white 
collar workers. Those living on unemployment benefits, social assistance and student allowances are 
actually a little bit less welfare chauvinist but the differences are not significant. Pensioners are 
significantly less welfare chauvinist in terms of child-allowances to children in county of origin than 
are high white collar workers (-0.16). Thus, it is difficult to find indication of strong self-interest 
effects; one cannot even find a correlation between the type of benefits received and welfare 
chauvinism in that area; students are e.g. not more reluctant to give access to universities than are other 
groups. However, there is one exception to this absence of narrow self-interest effects. Those living on 
disability benefits, often long term sick people fully dependent on the welfare state, are more inclined 
to hold welfare chauvinist attitudes. This effect is significant for attitudes to access to child-care (0.28), 
schools (0.28), universities (0.27), unemployment benefits (0.18) and child-allowances in host country 
(0.28); after taken difference in cultural and sociotropic perceptions into account. In ordinal logistic 
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regression the difference between disability pensioners and lower white collar workers does not turn 
significant for schools and university. Nevertheless, there is clear indications of higher welfare 
chauvinism among disability pensioners.  
 
Conclusion and discussion   
The article contributes with knowledge about how welfare chauvinist attitudes differ across welfare 
schemes. This is rare knowledge as most previous studies have relied on a single item from the ESS. 
The Danish case demonstrates that despite long term exposure to the anti-EU-, anti-migration and pro-
welfare-formula, the public has not adopted an across-program general reluctance to give social rights 
to EU-migrants. The main finding is a large variation across programs, which supports thesis H1. A 
majority of Danes was in favour of giving Eastern European workers immediate access to Nordic 
universal welfare services such as hospital treatment, child-care and primary and secondary schooling. 
In these areas the Danish public is less welfare chauvinist than what one would infer from the answers 
given to the general ESS-question. This is not a trivial finding as service expenditures constitute a very 
large part of the Danish welfare state and access to such services improves migrants’ living conditions 
significantly. In terms of services, the exception was access to free university education, where the 
public was more divided.  
The majority of Danes favoured more conditional access to unemployment benefits, social 
assistance and child-allowances given to children living in Denmark. The two most used answers were 
“only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year” and “once they become Danish 
citizens”. This is more in line with what one could infer from the ESS-data and reflects a situation, 
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where the Danish public (as most other publics throughout Europe) is in opposition to the current EU-
legislation. Making access to unemployment benefits conditional on a year of work in Denmark, the 
most common answer, could reflect that the public adheres to the idea of insurance paid in Denmark (in 
opposition to the current EU-legislation and the position of the EU-commission). Applying the same 
condition for access to social assistance could reflect that Danes are in favour of imposing some of the 
same rules on EU-migrants as Danish governments have imposed on non-EU-migrants. However, 
applying the same condition of one year of work, favoured by 38 percent, or the citizenship criterion, 
favoured by 31 percent, on child-allowance given to migrants’ children living in Denmark seems at 
odds with all previous policies. Since the introduction in 1987 child-allowance has been a flat-rate 
grant given to all residents with children below 18 years old (though with minor modification made in 
2010 and 2012). Favouring conditionality on this program indicates the limit to the theoretical 
argument that universal benefits generate their own support (as previously also argued by Bay and 
Pedersen, 2006)  (see also Andersen, 2015, for general attitudes to conditionality for child-allowances). 
Finally, the article shows that child-allowances given to children in the country of origin is 
highly contested; too a much larger extent that what one would infer from the Danes’ answers to the 
general ESS-items. This could reflect the controversy between the Danish government and the EU-
commission on this issue but it could also reflect a perception of a more fundamental violation of the 
residence criterion on which universalism in the Nordic countries and the UK rest. The future 
possibility to index these allowances to living conditions in the country of origin is unlikely to be 
enough to hamper these attitudes.  
 The large variation across programs does not mean that welfare chauvinist attitudes cannot be 
studied as a general phenomenon as it has been done in the previous studies. The Danish welfare 
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chauvinist attitudes did go together across programs and the study did find a similarity in correlations 
with background variables. This lends some support to H2.  Perceptions of cultural threat and 
perceptions of migrants being an economic burden were correlated with welfare chauvinism in all 
areas. The new-right-wing parties’ mobilization of welfare chauvinism based on xenophobic attitudes – 
or at least ethnic nationhood perceptions – is well-known. The mobilization of welfare chauvinism 
based on sociotropic concerns about the survival of the welfare state is also well-known but less 
empirical explored. The article demonstrates that these sociotropic concerns seem to be of high 
importance for understanding the welfare chauvinist attitudes; at least in the Danish case (though 
cultural threats might in general be more important for new-right-wing voting in Europe, Lucassen and 
Lubbers, 2012). This definitely does deliver opportunities for new-right-wing parties as they can 
mobilise outside the xenophobic segments. This is what has happened in Denmark as there is no 
indication that Danes in general have turned more xenophobic or more national conservative (Larsen, 
2016).  However, welfare chauvinism rooted in sociotropic concerns also delivers opportunities for 
pragmatic policy debates with point of departure in the actual pros and cons of intra-EU-migration. 
Finally, the article found little evidence that narrow personal self-interest has driven Danes to neglect 
the social rights of migrants though it has been one of the standard arguments in previous research;  at 
least theoretically. Some of the standard explanations of such findings have been the presence of other 
motives behind attitudes or the inability of surveys to reveal self-interest-effects. One could, however, 
also point to the fact that self-interest is actually fairly difficult to calculate on this matter; both for 
lower and upper strata. The exception is disability pensioners who know that they often will be 
dependent on the Danish welfare state for most of their life.     
   
 27 
 
References 
 Alesina A and Glaeser E (2004) Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe. A World of Difference. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Alesina A, Baqir R and Easterly W (1999) Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 114(4): pp. 1243-1284. 
Andersen JG (2015) Universalism eller målretning. Ambivalente holdninger og praktiske appliceringer 
af universalisme. In: Larsen CA and Andersen JG (eds) Den Universelle Velfærdsstat. : Frydenlund 
Academic. 
Barr N (2001) The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the 
State: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State. : OUP Oxford. 
Bay A and Pedersen AW (2006) The Limits of Social Solidarity Basic Income, Immigration and the 
Legitimacy of the Universal Welfare State. Acta Sociologica 49(4): 419-436. 
Crepaz MML and Damron R (2009) How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants. 
Comparative Political Studies 43(3): pp. 437-467. 
Eger MA and Valdez S (2014) Neo-nationalism in Western Europe. European Sociological Review: 
jcu087. 
Gerhards J and Lengfeld H (2013) European Integration, equality rights and people’s beliefs: Evidence 
from Germany. European Sociological Review 29(1): 19-31. 
Hainmueller J and Hopkins DJ (2014) Public attitudes toward immigration. Annual Review of Political 
Science 17. 
Hansen M, Schultz-Nielsen ML and Tranæs T (2015) The Impact of Immigrants on Public Finances: A 
Forecast Analysis for Denmark.  
Hedegaard TF and Larsen CA (2014) How proximate and visible policies shape self-interest, 
satisfaction, and spending support: the case of public service production. In: Stadelmann I and Kumlin 
S (eds) How Welfare States Shape the Democratic Public: Policy Feedback, Participation, Voting, and 
Attitudes. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 269-288. 
Hjorth F (2015) Who benefits? Welfare chauvinism and national stereotypes. European Union Politics: 
1465116515607371. 
Janmaat JG (2006) Popular conceptions of nationhood in old and new European member states: Partial 
support for the ethnic-civic framework. Ethnic and Racial Studies 29(1): 50-78. 
 28 
 
Johnston R, Banting K, Kymlicka W and Soroka S (2010) National Identity and Support for the 
Welfare State. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique 43(2): 
pp. 349-377. 
Kinder DR and Kiewiet DR (1981) Sociotropic politics: the American case. British Journal of Political 
Science 11(2): 129-161. 
Kohn H (1944) idea of nationalism.  
Kymlicka W and Banting K (2006) Immigration, multiculturalism, and the welfare state. Ethics & 
International Affairs 20(3): pp. 281-304. 
Larsen CA (2016) Den Danske Republik. Foranderinger i Danskernes Nationale Forestillinger. 
København: Hans Reitzel. 
Larsen CA (2006) The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes Influence Public 
Support   . : Ashgate Publishing. 
Larsen CA and Dejgaard TE (2013) The Institutional Logic of Images of the Poor and Welfare 
Recipients. A Comparative Study of British, Swedish and Danish Newspapers. Journal of European 
Social Policy 23(3): 287-299. 
Lucassen G and Lubbers M (2012) Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by 
distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats. Comparative Political Studies 45(5): 
547-574. 
Mewes J and Mau S (2013) Globalization, socio-economic status and welfare chauvinism: European 
perspectives on attitudes toward the exclusion of immigrants. International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology: 0020715213494395. 
Mewes J and Mau S (2012) Unraveling working-class welfare chauvinism. Contested Welfare States: 
Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond: 119-157. 
Miller D (1993) In defence of nationality. Journal of Applied Philosophy 10(1): 3-16. 
Petersen MB (2009) Public opinion and evolved heuristics: The role of category-based inference. 
Journal of Cognition and Culture 9(3): 367-389. 
Quadagno J (1994) The Color of Welfare. how Racism Undermined the War on Poverty. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Reeskens T and van Oorschot W (2012) Disentangling the ‘New Liberal Dilemma’: On the relation 
between general welfare redistribution preferences and welfare chauvinism. International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology: 0020715212451987. 
 29 
 
Rothstein B (1998) Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scheve KF and Slaughter MJ (2001) Labor market competition and individual preferences over 
immigration policy. Review of Economics and Statistics 83(1): 133-145. 
Schumacher G and van Kersbergen K (2014) Do mainstream parties adapt to the welfare chauvinism of 
populist parties? Party Politics: 1354068814549345. 
Van Der Waal J, De Koster W and Van Oorschot W (2013) Three worlds of welfare chauvinism? How 
welfare regimes affect support for distributing welfare to immigrants in Europe. Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 15(2): 164-181. 
Van der Waal J, Achterberg P, Houtman D, De Koster W and Manevska K (2010) ‘Some are more 
equal than others’: Economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism in the Netherlands. Journal of 
European Social Policy 20(4): 350-363. 
van Oorschot W (2006) Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among 
citizens of European welfare states. Journal of European Social Policy 16(1): 23-42. 
Van Oorschot W (2005) A European Deservingness Culture?: Public Deservingness Perceptions in 
European Welfare States. : Centre for Comparative Welfare State Studies (CCWS), Department of 
Economics, Politics and Public Administration, Aalborg University. 
Van Oorschot W and Uunk W (2007) Welfare Spending and the Public's Concern for Immigrants: 
Multilevel Evidence for Eighteen European Countries. Comparative Politics: 63-82. 
  
  
 30 
 
Online appendix 
 
Table A1: Public attitudes to when workers from East Europe should have the same rights as Danish 
citizens. Voters of Danish people’s party (n=491) 
 Immedia
tely on 
arrival 
After 
living in  
Denmark 
for a 
year, 
whether 
or not 
they 
have 
worked 
Only after 
they have 
worked 
and paid 
taxes for 
at least a 
year 
Once 
they 
have 
become a 
Danish 
citizen 
They 
should 
never get 
the same 
rights 
Total Mean 
(1-5) 
Treatment at 
hospitals 
38 7 30 19 7 100 2.5 
Primary and 
secondary schooling 
for children living in 
the country 
35 7 24 27 7 100 2.7 
Child-care 
institutions 
20 9 35 28 8 100 2.9 
University schooling 
for children living in 
the country 
13 5 33 40 9 100 3.3 
        
Unemployment 
benefits 
5 4 49 32 11 100 3.4 
Child-allowance to 
children living in the 
country 
4 4 33 45 14 100 3.6 
Social assistance: 2 4 36 41 16 100 3.7 
Child-allowances to 
children living in the 
country of origin 
0 1 8 24 68 100 4.6 
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Table A2: Ordinal logistic regression. Odds-ratios (bold significant at minimum 0.05-level; n = 2287) 
 Hospi-
tals 
Child-
care 
Schools Univer-
sity 
Unempl
oyment 
benefits 
Child-
allowan-
ce (host) 
Social 
assistan-
ce 
Child-
allowan-
ce 
(origin) 
Gender -.233 -.359 -.352 -.265 -.019 -.043 -.003 0.25 
Age 
 
-.025 -.012 -.024 -.006 -.007 -.011 -.014 .013 
Blue collar 
unskilled  
.014 .141 .222 -.148 .231 .055 -.100 -.148 
Blue collar 
skilled  
-.104 .027 .057 -.144 .006 .135 -.201 -.231 
White-collar 
low 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Whiter-collar 
high 
-.291 -.121 -.078 -.234 -.104 -.100 -.143 -.107 
self employed -.214 .014 -.158 -.201 -.259 -.245 -.052 -.618 
Unemployed 
(insured) 
-.277 -.081 .045 -.027 -.134 -.414 -.274 -.421 
Unemployed 
(social 
assistance) 
-.587 .203 -.065 -.198 .344 .018 -.506 .329 
Disability 
benefits 
-.420 .344 .321 .216 .203 .495 -.069 -.368 
Pensioner 
(and early 
retired) 
-.250 .146 .179 -.257 -.211 -.082 -.082 -.543 
Students -.425 .012 -.292 -.327 -.038 -.089 -.064 -.172 
Others 
 
-.026 .087 .146 .207 .060 .068 .006 -.266 
Cultural threat 
(1-5) 
.341 .371 .324 .354 .270 .376 .300 .207 
Contribution 
(0-10) 
-.110 -.125 -.104 -.118 -.154 -.171 -.158 -.114 
EU-welfare 
threat (1-5) 
.129 .140 .106 .232 .245 .298 .331 .450 
 
